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 The European Community launched, in November 1995, a comprehensive and 
multidimensional initiative known as the Barcelona Process, aimed at 
strengthening political, economic, and social relations between the European 
Union states and their neighbors in South Mediterranean Sea. One of the 
initiatives introduced under the umbrella of this Process is the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Central to this Partnership is the creation of 
Free Trade agreements between the Community and each MS, and similar 
agreements between the MS themselves. 
The aim of this research is to assess the effects of the Free Trade Agreements on 
the economies of the signatory countries Tunisia and Morocco from 1995 to 2017 
and attempts to explain eventual differences or similarities. The thesis will be 
following the design of comparative case studies between Tunisia and Morocco. 
To be precise the study will look at both cases simultaneously and trace the 
development in each country and analyze how economic variables are to be 
affected by the implementation of Free Trade Area, trade liberalization and tariff 
dismantling. 
 As for the contribution made by this research to the existing literature about the 
Euro-Med Economic integration process:  
i. Extending the evaluation (critical analysis) from 1995 until the year 201. 
ii. Using updated dataset to evaluate the effects of the Euro MED FTA   from 
the perspectives of South Mediterranean Countries (SMCs).  
Keywords:  Euro MED FTA; Association Agreement; Regional integration; Tariff 
dismantling; Trade Liberalization. 
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1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The Euro-Mediterranean FTA is based on the Barcelona process in European 
Neighborhood policy. The Barcelona Process, developed after the Barcelona 
conference in successive annual meeting, is a set of goals designed to lead to a free 
trade in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East by the year 2010. It has 
envisioned that an FTA with rules of origin within pan Euro-Mediterranean will be 
created. It will cover the European Union, the European Free trade area, the EU 
customs unions, the EU candidate states; the partners of the Barcelona process and 
at a later stage all of the European Neighborhood Policy partners. The Agadir 
Agreement of 2004 is seen as its first building block. Further steps are envisioned 
into the action plans negotiated between the EU and the partner states on the 
southern Mediterranean shores of the Mediterranean Sea. The initial aim is to 
create a matrix of free trade agreements between each of the partners and the 
others, and then a single free trade area is to be formed including the EU partners. 
For Southern Mediterranean Countries, trade liberalization has been an ongoing 
process for many decades, starting with the Association Agreement in 1990 and 
culminating in the launch of negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
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Trade Area in March 2013. Hence, the EU is the first trade partner for Southern 
Mediterranean countries, representing its first source of imports and its largest 
market for exports. 
Morocco and Tunisia both signed comprehensive integration agreements with the 
European Union in the early 1990s. These agreements consist of two essential 
elements increased aid flows and technical assistance in exchange for reductions in 
trade barriers and other impediments to the flow of goods and investment over a 
period of 12 years. 
Two decades after the launch of the Barcelona Process, the liberalization of trade in 
industrial products has become a tangible reality: all products from the 
Mediterranean countries have access to the EU market free of customs duties. 
Reciprocally, the Mediterranean countries have put in place a process of 
progressive dismantling of their tariffs. 
But since, manufactures products of SMS have already benefited from free access 
to European Markets after the former trade and cooperation agreements of 1970 
and since the new association agreements exclude agriculture products from free 
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trade, the EMFTAs seems not open up new export  opportunity and will amounts to 
a unilateral trade liberalization by the Mediterranean countries. 
The economies of Morocco and Tunisia share many characteristics. In these 
countries, agriculture is important, the state dominates the economy to varying 
degrees and the foreign trade regime is generally quite restrictive, despite greater 
openness to the European Union. The most important structural difference is that 
Morocco has a planned economy, while Tunisia has a more diversified economy. 
So in order to study the effects of EMFTAs, this thesis focuses only on the likely 
impact that trade liberalization and tariff dismantling, will have on the economic 
activity of these two Mediterranean States. 
1.1. Literature Review: 
 
The EU has always projected itself as a promoter of economic development. As 
part of its approach towards neighborhood countries, the European Union endorsed 
a Partnership that incorporates parallel engendering of deep democracy and 
economic development1 and prosperity. This is considered as an expansion of its 
                                                          
1 Milja Kurki 2012, Democratic futures. Previsioning democracy promotion,  
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role as a booster of development within its Common Market area, as outlined by 
the Maastricht Treaty2. 
However, this policy has not been without critics: for instance, Storey (2006)3 
criticized the Euro-centric trade policy approach towards North African countries. 
Flint, meanwhile, noted that EU and Western governments, when designing 
structural programs and trade policies aiming to reforming and developing the 
Southern Mediterranean states economically, failed generally to take into account 
the institutional weaknesses inhibiting them. 
 Mark Langan (2012)4 argued that the EU’s normative approach of development 
has aggravated the economic asymmetries between the Union and its developing 
neighbor’s country partners. 
In order to assess the impact of EU approach on the neighboring countries, various 
quantitative evaluations related to the Euro med partnership, especially the 
Barcelona Agreement has been tested. First, ex-ante studies (based on simulations 
using Computable General Equilibrium models, Suggest the existence of trade 
                                                          
2 The European Commission 1992 A Partnership for Democracy and shared with the southern 
Mediterranean. 
3 The European Union’s Trade Policy Response to the Crisis: Paradigm lost or reinforced? Storey, 
2006 
4 Mark Langan, 2012: Normative Power Europe in the Maghreb: A Moral Economy Perspective on 
the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements 
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potential between EU and MP countries as an indicator of the lack of regional 
integration. Also provides insight into the relationship of trade growth in MP. The 
sign of this relationship provides information on the ability of a regional agreement 
to revive economic growth through trade liberalization.  
Although there are large differences in results depending on the assumptions 
considered in the models, almost all studies highlight the positive effects on GDP 
and the growth of trade in MPs. A significant number of studies suggest a GDP and 
trade growth assumption of 5%. In fact, the Euro med agreement is expected to 
boost GDP by 12.2% in Morocco5 (Philippidis and Sajuan, 2006), and 8.9% in 
Tunisia6 (Augier and Gasiorek, 2003). Some simulations give even stronger trade 
effects: up to 54% for Morocco, 48% for Tunisia and 18% for Tunisia7. 
Yet, North-South agreements are considered the most promising by the World Bank 
(2000). Given the differences in factor endowments between partners, this type of 
agreement would offer the greatest potential for developing the economy. 
                                                          
5 Philippidis and Sajuan, An Examination of Morocco's Trade Options with the EU, 2006 
6 Augier, Patricia and Gasiorek, Michael (2003). The welfare implications of trade liberalization 
between the Southern Mediterranean and the EU. Applied Economics. 
7 Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stern The Effects of Multinational Production 
on Wages and Working  Conditions in Developing Countries 
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A recent study 8  by Bchir, Decreux, Fouquin, (2003) assesses the impact of 
association agreements on North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Morocco, Tunisia) plus Turkey. The study concludes that North African countries 
have a negative impact in transforming existing asymmetric trade agreements into 
symmetrical free trade agreements. In case of industrial liberalization (which is the 
case for current agreements with Tunisia and Morocco), the GDP loss would be -
1.7%. It would be -1.3% only if the agreements were extended to agricultural 
products, which is not currently the case. This result is mainly due to the fact that 
liberalization is unilateral, since the European market is already open to exporters 
from North Africa, and limited to products from the European Union. 
 
 Also, a study by Dessus and Suwa (1998)9, which measures the impact of the 
Association Agreement with the European Union on the Tunisian economy using 
an EGC model, concludes that the agreement has negative impact for Tunisia in 
terms of GDP and this impact only becomes positive if we make an assumption of 
externalities on exports linked to the agreement. This can be explained by EU 
                                                          
8Bchir, Decreux, Fouquin, 2003 Libéraliser les échanges commerciaux : quels effets sur la 
croissance et le développement ? journal Economie et Statistique 
9 Dessus and Suwa ,1998, Development Centre Studies Regional Integration and Internal Reforms 
in the Mediterranean Area. 
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exclusion of agriculture from the trade agreements and by multiplying non-tariff 
barriers under various pretexts to protect its businesses. 
 
Philippe LANGEVIN10 argues that over the last 25 years (1980-2004), partner 
countries have benefited little from globalization, whether in terms of per capita 
income, the development of trade flows or the attraction of foreign direct 
investment. “According to the most commonly accepted estimates, partner 
countries must create 2 million jobs over 15 years to simply contain the current 
unemployment rate. Recent economic projections show that high growth rates can 
only be achieved by deep regional economic integration". 
Overall it becomes clear that, in a globalized economy, the socio-economic 
challenges facing the Mediterranean countries are large: for them, they have to 
undertake major structural and modernization reforms in order to progressively 
gain access to the market economy, adopt international standards in order to be 
competitive in international markets and to create favorable conditions for the 
massive job creation called by rapid demographic growth.  
                                                          
10 Philippe LANGEVIN (octobre 2006), « Le processus d’intégration économique euro 
méditerranéenne : Le rôle des services dans l’agro-industrie, l’innovation et les technologies », 
Université de la Méditerranée. Marseille. P 1- 10. 
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1.2. Aims and Objectives: 
 
The Maghreb countries have strategic relations with the European Union. The latter 
holds a monopoly in the volume of trade with the Maghreb countries, according to 
statistics for the year 2006. Tunisia tops the list with 74.4%, followed by Morocco 
with 61.2%. 
After the launching of the Barcelona Process, the trade liberalization of the 
industrial products became a tangible reality. All the products coming from the 
Mediterranean countries have access to the market of the European Union duty-
free of customs. Reciprocally, the Mediterranean countries set up a process of 
progressive dismantling their customs tariffs. The agreements of association 
comprise commercial provisions which envisage a progressive dismantling of their 
customs duties. Thus, liberalization became effective for all the industrial products 
and more than 80% of the imported agricultural produce which enter the duty-free 
EU or at preferential rates. Reciprocally, 1/3 of European exports of agricultural 
products profit from tariff preferences in the Mediterranean countries. 
 
The economies of Tunisia, Morocco share many characteristics. In these two 
countries, agriculture is important, the public sector dominates the economy to 
9 
 
different degree, both have diversified economies and the pattern of the foreign 
trade is in general rather restrictive, in spite of a larger opening on the European 
Union. The most important structural difference is that Morocco is considerably 
larger from a population (exceeds 30 million in Morocco, conversely Tunisia has a 
population of just over 10 millions) and land area perspective (Morocco 274,461 
square miles while Tunisia 63,378 square miles). 
The present study proposes to analyze the impact of FTA on the macroeconomic 
indicators of Tunisia and Morocco as well as on the trade between the two North 
African countries.  
1.3. Research Question: 
 
This thesis specifically will examine the EU–North Africa trade liberalization 
experience between 1995 and 2017, and enquires whether this process has helped 
the Mediterranean states transform their economic basis and industrialize as they 
pursues better social standards for its people. 
In sum, this thesis intends to looking at how trade liberalization between the EU 
and both Tunisia and Morocco would affect the latter’s internal economic dynamic 




 Its main question is:  
What is the impact of this alliance between the European Union and the Maghreb c
ountries? Will this association have a positive or negative impact on the economies 
of the Maghreb countries? 
From this main question, we can deduce other questions which are: 
• Is the economic partnership a strategic choice for the Maghreb countries, or
 is it a necessity imposed by the globalization which supposes that the idea 
of the groupings is a new framework of the contemporary   international rel
ations? 
• Does tariff dismantling coincide with the anticipated increase in investment 
and reallocation of   factors of production, two of the main intermediate      
objectives sought by the Barcelona Process? 
• Did the destabilizing effects anticipated in the short term on public finances
 and the balance of payments materialize and weaken major                         
macroeconomic balances? 
• Has tariff dismantling begun to have a positive impact on the final objective
 of the process, the renewal of the growth regime? 
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Estimating the impact of the free trade area on Tunisia and Morocco's macro-economic 
situation poses two main methodological difficulties:  
1. Most of the expected benefits of the free trade area are indirect and medium and    
long term. 
2. While the costs are mostly direct and short term. 
1.4. Hypothesis: 
 
To answer these question three hypotheses will be tested under two conditions: 
H1: Trade liberalization would encourage Tunisia and Morocco to diversify 
production and industrialize and thus would have a positive impact on their 
respective economies. 
H3: The Economic dependence of Tunisia and Morocco has a positive impact on 
the level and speed with which they adopt European norms and achieve success in 
their respective economic development process. 
Condition 1: 
The gains from the partnership and the free trade area must be greater than the total 
cost of the reforms needed to meet the two initial objectives of improving 
competitiveness and enhancing growth and cohesion. Undoubtedly, the 
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Mediterranean collaboration augurs substantial gains that raise the question of their 
financing. 
Condition 2: 
The partnership zone must be a region of mutual benefit, whatever the measures 
implemented, economic situation of all parties should not deteriorate are in the area 
covered by the partnership or outside it. In other words, the results of the 
partnership must be optimal for each participating country. Thus the Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement should consolidation the national 
competitiveness of European as well as MPs countries, and should not slow down 
growth or make serious social crises. 
1.5. Research Methodology: 
 
The thesis specifically looked at FTAs in the context of the Barcelona Process and 
ENP to examine whether trade liberalization is an appropriate strategy that would 
help the Southern MS economically develop and acquire better opportunities and 
competitiveness for their enterprises. It intends to take a more direct approach to 
measuring the impact of trade liberalization on economic indicators, mostly ex-ante 
13 
 
quantified analysis of how free trade area has affected the economies of both south 
Mediterranean countries Tunisia and Morocco. 
First, an analytical framework for the economic development experience in Tunisia 
and Morocco will be analyzed through applying the determinants of economic 
development on both MS. There follows an assessment of the economic impact of 
the Euro-Mediterranean free Trade Areas (EMFTAs), an analysis of trade 
liberalization effects on economic variables of both Tunisia and Morocco: 
1. Impact on trade 
2. Impact on the balance of payment 
3. Impact on the state and public finances 
4. Impact on industry and businesses 
Third, some analysis will be elaborated on the South-South component of Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership namely its impact on the bilateral trade liberalization 
between Tunisia and Morocco through using Grubel Lyod Index.  
Finally, the essay will seeks to identify the reasons why the gains of this FTA are so 
limited for the SMP and explore possible national policies and accompanying 
measures within the framework of EMFTAs could be used to mitigate the negative 
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economic consequences which may result from trade liberalization and hence 
strengthen their economic and social sustainability. 
This method requires selecting and analyzing very different cases in order to 
eventually identify similar and overlapping tendencies that can be believed to hold 
true across the whole SMC. Thus, as the FTA covers ten countries in its Southern 
Mediterranean region, analyzing all of them is not possible due to the limits of this 
project. However, it is still possible to understand the flaws of the FTZ by 
investigate the two most considered advanced cases.  
Tunisia is chosen because it is considered to be very cooperative with the EU, first 
to have concretized the different stages of realization of a free trade zone with the 
European Union and is now in democratic transition; Morocco, on the other hand, 
has often been considered as the EU success story and has a stable authoritarian 
political regime.  
Such selection helps to evaluate the impact the FTZ has had on these economies 




2. CHAPTER 2:  ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE 
(1995 AND 2017): 
 
In this chapter we will look at two Mediterranean States, TUNISIA and 
MORROCO, and refers to determinants of economic development theory in order 
to present a case that the low economic development in both MS is due to the 
EURO MED FTA. Through provide a theoretical explanation as to why 
liberalization would encourage Tunisia and Morocco to specialize in producing and 
exporting agricultural products and light manufactures, both of which are unlikely 
to reap a substantial added economic value and would prevent the two economies 
from attaining higher income levels. Thus actual trade liberalization would it be the 
most appropriate strategy to help MS develop their economies? Or it would inhibit 
their ability to diversify production and industrialize, which is a prerequisite to a 
successful developmental transition? 
As we have learned, there are three ways to model economic growth: First as an 
outward shift in the   Production Possibility Frontier of the economy, second as a 
shift to the right in its aggregate supply curve. Third, both factors of production and 
technology change positively leads to shift in both curves. Therefore, anything that 
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increases the quantity or quality of factors of production or that improves the 
technology available to the economy contributes to economic growth. 
Determinants of economic growth are factors that directly influence the rate of 
economic growth. These are six major determinants of growth. Two of these are 
typically grouped under outward shift in PPF and increase in a country’s potential 
output which include economic system & capital formation and natural resources 
and land area. The other four categories are supply factors which include political 
stability & corruption, population & human capital, international environment & 
government policies, and finally conditions in foreign trade & FTA grouped under 
outward shift in supply curve. 
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2.1. Economic Growth between 1995 and 2017: 
Figure 1: GDP per capita Growth between 1994 and 2016: 
 
Source: World Bank Data 
 
As shows Figure1, during the second half of the 1990s, Morocco GDP per capita 
growth has deeply fluctuated, but beginning from 2000 onwards it became more 
stable. This fluctuation in Morocco’s growth during those years can be explained 
well by a long lasting drought. Given that agriculture play an important role in 
Morocco’s economy, so when that sector is experiencing difficulties the effects are 
felt immediately in the economic performance of the country. 
Tunisia, on the other hand, saw relatively stable growth between 1994 and 2009. 
And there was a sharp drop in 2011 due to the turmoil that Tunisia experienced 
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On average both countries experienced a relatively similar level of GDP per capita 
growth at roughly 2.5% between 1994 and 20017. This indicator can to certain 
extent explain the similarity of economic development in Tunisia and Morocco.  
 
Figure 2: Trend of unemployment rate: 
 
Source: World Bank Data 
 
Generally, when unemployment rates is increasing, economic development is more 
likely to be troubled, while if unemployment rates is falling that can be considered 
as an indicator for a sound and performing economy. 
Over the period 1995-2017, the unemployment shows a plateau trend in Tunisia 
and a modest downward trend in Morocco.  
In Tunisia the unemployment rate remained relatively unchanged between 1996 














2011 only to then fall back to 15% in 2013 and continue to rise steadily during the 
rest of the period covered by thesis. Meanwhile, Morocco’s unemployment rate fell 
from a high of 23% in 1995 to 9% in 2006. For the next years, until 2017, the 
unemployment numbers stagnated around that figure.  
Figure 3: Gini Index rate between 1994 and 2017: 
 
Source: World Bank Data 
 
In Morocco the Gini Index remained almost unchanged, staying around 40, while 
in Tunisia the Gini Index fall slightly from 41.7 in 1995 to 35.8 in 2010.  
In the two cases, the Gini Index does not reveal very much about the level of 
economic development and also does not show the distribution of inequality, 
because income inequality between different regions in Tunisia was an important 






























































Economic Liberalization Studies have shown that the level of economic 
development can be linked to the level of economic liberalization. The basic 
assumption is that the more open an economy is the more developed it will 
become. To measure economic liberalization this part looks at volume of trade (as a 
percentage of GDP). 
Figure 4: Trend of Trade between 1994 and 2017: 
 
Source: World Bank Data 
 
While Tunisia has had a consistently higher trade share; the trend of development 
does not differentiate too much. 
Morocco saw a slow increase of trade from 55% to 60% between 1994 and 2003. 
Then in the following years until 2008 the share of trade increased massively to 
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In Tunisia the development at first looked less positive, dropping from 92% in 
1994 to 78% in 1999. Starting in 2002 trade became more important again and by 
2008 it made up 114% of Tunisia’s GDP. Just like in Morocco, the share of trade 
dropped sharply to 93% in 2009, therefore, it is likely that it was caused by the 
same phenomenon. The global financial crisis of 2008 suggests itself as an 
explanatory factor.  
Between 2004 and 2008, Southern Mediterranean exports to and imports from the 
EU have grown by an average of, respectively, 11% and 8% per year. In 2009, 
trade registered a strong contraction in account (-20% compared to 2008), but in 
2010 the trend start to recover. 
The one indicator where notable impact can be observed on the degree of economic 
development is trade. Euro-Mediterranean total trade was almost €200 billion in 
2009 (EU exports to Southern Mediterranean countries was around €114 billion; 
Southern Mediterranean states exports to the EU totaled €86 billion), representing 
almost 10% of total EU external trade, and more than 40% of total Southern 
Mediterranean trade. Given the rising importance of trade beginning from the 
signature of the Barcelona Process, it makes sense to take a closer look at this 
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factor and assess its eventual impact. This will be done in the next chapter where 
the impact of Euro med FTA on the economies of both countries will be assessed. 
2.2. Gross Capital Formation and Economic System: 
2.2.1. GDP Growth and Gross Capital Formation: 
Scholars in neoclassical or exogenous growth theories explained the determinants 
of the long-run growth. According to Solow neoclassical growth theory, the 
income per capita growth rate is explained merely by the exogenous rate of 
technological rate. This theory argues that technological revolution and GCF plays 
a significant role in economic growth, and the latter cannot be sustainable without 
advances in technology. Thus, technological advances impact the economic growth 
that cannot take place unless technological developments are available. 
Table 2: Gross capital formation between 1995 and 2017 
Country Name Morocco Tunisia 
Years 
GCF (constant 
2010 million US$)  
GCF (annual  % 
growth) MOR  
GCF (constant 2010 
Million US$) 
GCF 
( annual % 
growth) TUN  
1995 11285.84 7.89 5075.33 5.03 
1996 11774.17 4.33 5630.63 10.94 
1997 12641.91 7.37 5925.37 5.23 
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1998 14914.97 17.98 6187.36 4.42 
1999 14613.89 -2.02 6433.00 3.97 
2000 14878.74 1.81 6600.06 2.60 
2001 16275.10 9.38 7061.81 7.00 
2002 17117.69 5.18 6686.75 -5.31 
2003 20307.79 18.64 7088.35 6.01 
2004 22213.69 9.39 7381.93 4.14 
2005 22011.74 -0.91 6953.68 -5.80 
2006 23839.40 8.30 7744.64 11.37 
2007 27028.92 13.38 8653.53 11.74 
2008 33211.92 22.88 9532.02 10.15 
2009 32325.61 -2.67 10647.56 11.70 
2010 31763.06 -1.74 11738.46 10.25 
2011 35029.58 10.28 10660.08 -9.19 
2012 34703.04 -0.93 11628.61 9.09 
2013 36438.43 5.00 12314.32 5.90 
2014 35637.94 -2.20 13314.86 6.03 
2015 35946.62 0.87 13996.47 6.42 
2016 40134.29 11.65 14001.22 6.67 
2017 41488.34 3.37 13318.33 6.02 
Average GCF  25460.12 6.40 9068.45 5.41 




Figure 5: Gross Capital Formation Trend between 1995 and 2017: 
 
Source: The WORLD BANK Data Bank 
 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Morocco increased to 41488 US$ Million in 
2017 from 40134 US$ Million in 2016. Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Morocco 
averaged 25460.12 US$  Million with average annual  growth rate of about 6.40 % 
from 1995 until 2017, reaching an all-time high Growth rate of 11.65 % in 2016 
and a record low Growth rate of -2.20 % in 1999 and 2014. Tunisia’s Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation was reported at 13318.33 USD Million in Dec 2017. This 
records a decrease from the previous number of 14001.22 USD Million for Dec 
2016. Tunisia Gross Fixed Capital Formation data, averaging 9068.45 USD Million 
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an all-time high Growth of about 10% between 2006 and 2010, a record decline of 
-9 % in 2011 and stagnation at around 6% between 2014 and 2017. 
Figure 6: Correlation between GDP growth and GCF: 
 
Source: The WORLD BANK Data Bank  
 
The aim of this part is to determine the impact of domestic investment on 
economic growth in Tunisia and Morocco during the period of 1995 to 2017. 
According to the results, we find that there is a positive impact of domestic 
investment GFCF on economic growth in Morocco (GDP Growth MOR = 3.403 + 
GCF * 2.096 the coefficient value is in the positive range), then that indicates the 
relationship between the variables is positively correlated, or both values increase 
or decrease together; however, there is negative relationship between domestic 
investment and economic growth in Tunisia: GDP Growth TUN = 7.423 + GCF * 
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( -4.223) then that indicates that the relationship between the variables is negatively 
correlated, or as one value increases, the other decreases. 
This is due to the importance of the geographical location of Morocco. The 
Moroccan government also encourages investors to invest and trade on their land 
by providing them with the convenience and ease of procedures. In addition, 
Morocco is a politically stable country with laws in force. 
The technological development witnessed by Morocco has helped the owners of 
factories and companies to excel in their work by improving the quality of 
production and marketing and at all other levels. 
2.2.2. Economic System: 
 
Table 3: Break down of Tunisian Economic Activity by sector: 
Breakdown of Economic Activity By Sector Agriculture Industry Services 
Employment By Sector (in % of Total Employment) 13.7 42.6 43.7 
Value Added (in % of GDP) 9.6 26.7 63.7 
Value Added (Annual % Change) 2.5 -1.5 0.6 
 
Source: World Bank, Latest Available Data 2017.    
 
Agriculture is a key sector of the Tunisian economy. It accounts for 10.1% of the 
GDP and employs nearly 15% of the workforce. This performance is the 
consequence of the large-scale support and modernization efforts made within the 
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framework of the country's development policy, as well as the regulation of 
agricultural and rural activities. 
Industry represents 28.3% of the GDP and employs one-third of the workforce. The 
textile industry has been relatively hit by Asian competition. The country's 
industrial sectors are predominantly export-oriented.  
The local economy is largely orientated towards services, which account for 61.6% 
of the GDP, including the booming sectors of ICT (Information and communication 
technologies) and tourism. The service sector employs nearly one-half of the 
country's workforces. Tourism, which suffered from terrorist attacks that hit the 
Tunisian soil, started to recover in 2017. 
The economic system of the country presents several facets. It is characterized by a 
large opening towards the outside world. France remains the primary trade partner 
(supplier and customer) of Morocco. France is also the primary creditor and 
foreign investor in Morocco.  
Since the early 1980s, the Moroccan government has pursued an economic 
program toward accelerating real economy growth with the support of the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Paris Club of creditors. The 
country's currency, the dirham, is now fully convertible for current account 
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transactions; reforms of the financial sector have been implemented; and state 
enterprises are being privatized. 
Table 4: Composition of Moroccan Economic Activity by sector: 
GDP - composition by sector Agriculture:  14.8% 
 Industry:  29.10% 
 Services: 56% 
   
Source: World Bank, Latest Available Data 2017. 
    
2.3. Land Area and Natural Resources: 
2.3.1. Land Area: 
 
With reference to the neoclassic growth theory “land input has a marginal effect on 
economic growth and may even have a positive effect with the constant input in 
technology and other factors of production”. Some analysis indicate that most of 
time in growth regressions, land inputs show up as a leverage to economic growth. 
Economies with abundant land area can lease industrial land at lower prices to 
attract investors or enhance national revenues by leasing land to finance 
infrastructure and urbanization which can reflect increasing investment and 
promotes large-scale economic growth. Therefore Land input is an important factor 
for governments to compete for economic growth. From this perspective 
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Morocco’s economy seems to be more favored than Tunisian economy. 
From this perspective, with 446,550 km², Morocco seems to be more favored in 
terms of land area than Tunisia which lays over 163,610 km². 
2.3.2. Natural resources: 
Figure 7: Trend of natural Resources rents between 1995 and 2017 
 
Source: World Bank Data.   
 
According to the World Bank development indicators database, In Morocco the 
total natural resources rents in percentage of GDP were established at around 
2.4794 % in 2016. The average value between 1995 and 2017 was 1.96 percent 
with a minimum of 0.25 percent in 1994 and a maximum of 10.46 percent in 1974. 
The average value for Tunisia during the same period was reported at 5.3 percent 
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Although it seems to be obvious that natural resources rents have a positive impact 
on economic growth, through improving national revenue and wealth, many 
researches have resulted to ambiguous outcomes. It has been shown that several 
countries rich in natural resources have experienced low economic growth and vice 
versa. Still the key challenges concern government policies and effectiveness to 
turn resource rents into a leverage to boost economic growth rather than a 
detriment of development.  
2.4. Political Stability and Corruption: 
2.4.1. Political Stability: 
 
Figure 8: Political Stability Index between 2000 and 2015 
 


















































































 Although it was a downward trend, until 2009, Tunisia was more stable politically 
than Morocco. Its Political Stability Index was 3.7 in 1995 and 0 in 2009. But since 
2011 there was a sharp decline in the index that rich -1 in 2015 and this due to 
destabilization after the revolution and the collapse of authoritarian political 
regime. Over the period 1995-2016, the average value for Tunisia was -0.16 points 
with a minimum of -0.99 points in 2016 and a maximum of 0.32 points in 2000. 
While, for Morocco it’s established at -0.35 points during the same period with a 
minimum of -0.57 points in 2008 and a maximum of 0.31 points in 1998.  
2.4.2. Corruption: 
 
Corruption is considered to be a strong obstacle for growth and development. The 
academic literature finds that corruption has negative effect on economic 
performance and growth, especially through political instability (accounts for about 
53% of the total effect) and also through reducing the share of private investment 
and the level of human capital. “A one-unit increase in the corruption index 
reduces the growth rate by 0.545 percentage points”11.  
  
                                                          
11 Mo, Pak Hung, Corruption and Economic Growth, March 2001, pp. 66–79. 
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Figure 9: Corruption perception Index between 2000 and 2015 
 
Source: The GlobalEconomy.com, World Bank. 
 
Over the period of 2001-2015, Tunisian average value of corruption index was 
established at 44 points with a minimum of 38 points in 2011 and a maximum of 
53 points in 2001. While the average value for Morocco during the same period 
was 35 points with a minimum of 32 points in 2004 and a maximum of 39 points in 
2014. 
2.5. Population growth and human Capital: 
2.5.1. Population Growth versus GDP Growth: 
 
The relationship between population growth and economic growth is controversial, 















































































economic problems while high population growth in low-income countries may 
slow their development. 
 Many analysts argue that “economic growth in high-income countries is likely to 
be relatively slow in coming years in part because population growth in these 
countries is predicted to slow down considerably” 12 (Baker, Delong, & Krugman, 
2005). Others argue that “population growth has always been problematic as more 
people will consume and use more of the finite resources available”13 (Daniel W. 
Linden, 2017). 
Economic growth can be measured by changes in a country’s GDP which can be 
decomposed into two parts: population and economic elements (population * GDP 
per capita). In that Economic growth = Population growth + GDP per capita growth 
(Thomas Piketty, 2014)14. 
 
 
                                                          
12 Dean Baker, J. Bradford Delong and Paul Krugman, 2005, Asset Returns and Economic Growth 
13 Daniel W. Linden, 2017, Examining the occupancy–density relationship for a low‐density 
carnivore 
14 Thomas Piketty, 2014, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, p. 72 
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Figure 10: Population Growth between 1995 and 2017 
 
Source: World Bank Data. 
 
2.5.2. Human Capital: 
Figure 11: Human Development Index 
 
Source: The GlobalEconomy.com, World Bank. 
 
Between 200 and 2017 The Human development index shows an average value of 










































































of 0.735 points in 2017 (the global ranking is 95). While it’s established at an 
average value of 0.585 points for Morocco with a minimum of 0.526 points in 
2000 and a maximum of 1.4 .667 points in 2017. (Global raking is 121 over 181 
countries). 
Figure 12: Tertiary School Enrollment in Tunisia and Morocco between 2000 and 
2015 
 
Source: The GlobalEconomy.com, World Bank. 
 
Between 2000 and 2015, this indicator show an average value of 15.96 % for 
Tunisia with a minimum of 19 % in 2000 and a maximum of 35.22 percent in 
2012, (ranked 52). While it show on average 10.38 % for Morocco with a 
minimum of 10% in 2000 and a maximum of 31.96 percent in 2016. Global ranked 
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Many recent studies findings approve that there is a very strong correlation 
between technology advancements, human capital investment, and economic 
growth. In that long term investment in human capital can clearly help grow 
economies and this effect has the potential to be a changer especially in world 
increasingly globalized. In this perspective if we look for example to the top 25% 
of countries that have improved human capital over the last 25 years, and we 
compare them to the bottom 25 % of countries that have not invested enough in 
developing human capital over the same period; the difference in economic growth 
is as high as 1.25% of GDP per year, and that connection is going to be more 
powerful as the economy becomes more digitized and requires more sophistication. 
And this is not all because otherwise, if population does not get the education 
necessary they are going to find themselves in an economy where they cannot 
compete and that’s going to be a source of instability, conflict and violence going 
forward. 
2.6. International Environment and Government effectiveness: 






Figure 13: Trend in FDI net inflow between 1994 and 2017 
 
 Source: World Bank Data 
 
Foreign direct investment has played a small role in both countries. In Tunisia the 
share of FDI fluctuated between 1% to just over 3% until 1998. By 2003 it 
decreased and remained steady at just 2% until 2005, but then rose dramatically to 
fewer than 10% in 2006. By 2009 this share dropped down to 3.5% and by 2011 to 
1%. Again the global financial crisis is likely to be the cause for the downturn in 
the years 2008 and 2009 and the revolution for the downturn in 2011. Meanwhile, 
Until 2002 FDI made up less than 1% in Morocco. Not counting the spike in 2003 
(4.4%), the share of FDI rose steadily to 3.8% in 2007, before dropping to 2% in 
2009. Since 2011 it starts to rise benefiting from the decrease in Tunisia. 
At this stage it is difficult to make a statement about the observable development. 
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respective economies, given that it happened in a similar time period in both 
countries or it may just be related to the global market developments. 
2.6.1.1. Evolution of FDI in Morocco: 
 
Table 5: Evolution of FDI Flows (Millions of US Dollars) 
 



















Morocco 428 564 423 2808 481 2314 853 1230 1390 
Source: World Bank (2015), Executive Summary - International Finance. 
 
Relying mainly on the national privatization program launched in 1993, Morocco 
has attracted relatively large flow and increased foreign capital. The contribution of 
FDI to gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) thus improved significantly, from an 
annual average of 5% between 1990, 1995 to 17.6% between 1999, 2004. FDI 
flows vary however, year-on-year because of Morocco's difficulties in developing 
an independent dynamic of privatization operations. In the medium term, the 
gradual decline in privatization could therefore lead to a decline in FDI flows. 
Thus, foreign exchange earnings were established according to the Exchange 
Office at $ 1.6 billion in 2004, a decrease of 41.8% compared to 2003. In total, 
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foreign investment income contributed in 2004 to 3.2% of GDP and 13% of GFCF 
compared to 5.7% and 24.3% respectively in 2003. 
The increases observed in FDI flows were notably made possible by the dynamics 
of integration into the world economy initiated at the turn of the 1990s. Thus, the 
convertibility of the Dirham was established in 1993 and the country joined the 
GATT in 1987.  
In 1996, an association agreement was concluded with the European Union. A free 
trade agreement was also signed in June 2004 with the United States and is 
expected to come into force in 2006. In addition, Morocco is negotiating several 
"South-South" trade agreements. 
A free trade agreement with Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia was signed in February 
2004. Likewise, a free trade agreement was signed with Turkey in April 2004. In 
addition, Morocco has established incentives to attract FDI flows such as: 
- The structural adjustment program adopted in 1983; 
- The privatization process launched in 1989. 
- The Investment Charter promulgated on November 8, 1995 (replacing the 1983 
Investment Code) which includes measures to reduce the cost of investment and 
allows the free transfer of invested foreign capital and capital gains performed.  
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- The creation in 2002 of the 16 Regional Investment Centers. They are intended to 
provide business start-up aid as well as investment aid and regional promotion to 
investors. These centers aim to make the region a space for promoting national and 
international investment. 
Historically, because of relatively low labor costs, manufacturing industries are the 
largest investment item. Indeed, Morocco has primarily tried to specialize in the 
reception of FDI related to subcontracting activities in the textile / clothing and 
electrical and electronic construction and even automotive sectors. At present, 
more and more FDI flows are moving towards service activities (call center 
especially) and tourism because of its proximity to the EU. 
2.6.1.2. Evolutions of FDI in Tunisia: 
 
The dynamics of Tunisia's integration into the international economy began in the 
1970s following a change in the legislation on FDI and the gradual introduction of 
tax incentives, notably after taking on charge by the State (total or partial) of social 
contributions for a period of 5 years. 
With the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Plan (SAP) in 1986, the 
liberalization of the Tunisian economy has greatly increased: price freedom, 
privatization program, openness to trade, convertibility of the currency and 
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freedom of movement of capital. Since the implementation of the SAP, other 
measures have been decided: 
- Creation of free zones in 1992. 
- Code of Investment Incentives in 1994. 
- Integration in the WTO and accession to various multilateral treaties, for example 
the Association Agreement with the EU signed in July 1995. 
 
Table 6: FDI indicators in Tunisia (1994 - 2016) 
       Years 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 
FDI / GDP 
(%) 
3.4 1.8 1.4 1.9 3.4 1.8 4 2.4 3.9 2.4 2.3 
FDI / FBCF 
(%) 
12.7 7.6 6.2 7.8 13.6 7 15.2 9.3 15.4 10.1 10.2 
FDI / External 
capital 
inflows 
20.6 13.5 11.3 14.7 31.5 14.8 28.7 18.8 27.8 21.6 18.7 
Source: Annual Reports Central Bank of Tunisia. 
 
Internal liberalization and external liberalization reforms have led to changes in 
FDI flows. Thus, the movement of FDI will experience strong growth from the 
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beginning of the seventies followed by a slight deceleration at the end of this 
decade and a recovery in the early eighties (Zouari & Sboui, 2004)15.  
 
This acceleration in FDI flows can be explained in part by the dynamics of the 
textile industry. From the mid-eighties, movements in FDI flows will be much 
more irregular. During two periods, significant increases will take place: in 1991 - 
1992 firstly because of specific investments in oil exploration and the gas field then 
in 2000 due to the increase of investments benefiting the sector of industries 
manufacturing (privatization of two cement plants acquired by Portuguese and 
Italian developers). 
Although it has a relatively favorable administrative and legislative framework for 
hosting FDI, Tunisia receives only a modest share. Thus, Tunisia's record in world 
FDI and investment in developing countries hardly exceeded the respective values 
of 1.1% and 3.2% recorded in 1982. Moreover, the share of FDI in GDP remains 
low with an average rate of 2.5% for the period 1994-2001. The cumulative flows 
by Tunisia remain low compared to the countries of South-East Asia. 
                                                          
15 Sonia Zouari and Faouzi Sboui, Investissements directs étrangers et processus de 
désendettement dans le contexte de mondialisation: le cas de la Tunisie, 2004. 
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Geographically, capital inflows are mainly of European origin, with a steady 
increase from France and Great Britain, the emergence of Italy, and the 
deterioration of the Netherlands and Spain. The Arab countries (especially those of 
the Gulf) occupy the second rank. The share of the United States remains modest 
and irregular.  
At the sectorial level, hydrocarbons having been one of the first sectors to attract 
FDI since 1994 are in decline due to lack of potential reserves. The rest of FDI is 
oriented towards services (tourism and real estate) and to a lesser extent to 
manufacturing industries. 
2.6.2. Government Effectiveness: 
Figure 14: Government effectiveness 1995 and 2015 
 
Source: The GlobalEconomy.com, World Bank. 
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Over the period 1995 – 2011 Tunisian government has been more effective than 
Moroccan Government. The average value for Morocco during that period was -
0.12 points with a minimum of -0.28 points in 2005 and a maximum of -0 points in 
1998. While the average value for Tunisia during the same period shows 0.27 
points with a minimum of -0.21 points in 2016 and a maximum of 0.64 points in 
2006. 
But beginning from 2011, government effectiveness index of Tunisia declined 
steadily and this can be explained by the turmoil that the country has experienced 




3. CHAPTER 3: INTER REGIONAL IMPACT OF EMFTAs: 
 
In this chapter we will focus on the assessment of the impact of the Euro-
Mediterranean free Trade Areas (EMFTAs) on the two SMCs economy, through 
analyzing the trade liberalization effects on some economic variables of both 
Tunisia and Morocco: 
1. Impact on trade: here we will be using a gravity model taking export and 
imports of both countries as Dependent variables. 
2. Impact on the balance of payment 
3. Impact on the state and public finances 
4. Impact on industry and businesses 
3.1. Impact on trade: 
3.1.1. Gravity Model:  Export and Imports as Dependent Variables: 
 
To assess the effects of EUROMED FTA in it’s both dimensions (Vertical and 
Horizontal trade liberalization) we use a gravity equation of bilateral trade flows in 
its extended form.  
The Dependent variable used in this estimating equation are bilateral imports and 
exports flows that covers the period between 1995 and 2017 of the two 
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Mediterranean states: Tunisia and Morocco that are considered as the most 
advanced among the MENA countries in trade liberalization with the European 
union as well as with each other (low level of economic development and trade). 
While, the Independent (explanatory) variables include among others two dummy 
variables related to trade liberalization process: 
1. Euro MED FTA: indicating the free trade agreement with EU: North-South 
cooperation (vertical trade liberalization). 
2. AMU: indicating Agadir bilateral trade agreement between the two North 
African countries: South-South cooperation (Horizontal trade 
liberalization).  
Estimating Equation: 
Equation 1: Estimating Equation: Trade Values as independent variables 
In VTijt = Σ βk RTA ijt + α1In GDP it + α2 GDP jt + α3 In Distance + α4 
Language +                α5 Contiguity + α6 Colony + ε ijt. 
 
Where: Parameter Estimates (coefficients) 
In VT  ijt: refers to the value of trade, imports and exports respectively between country i 
and country j in year t. Available on UN COMTRADE database period 1995-2017. 
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RTA ijt: is a dummy variable indicating whether countries I and j are both the members of 
a bilateral or a multilateral regional preferential trade agreement in year t. 
In GDPijt: Log GDP in country i and country j in year t, Available on World bank 
Database and cover the period between 1995 and 2017. 
Contiguity ij: a dummy variable indicating whether the two countries have common 
border or not (1 if the two countries share common border and 0 if not). 
Language ij: a dummy variable indicating if the two partners have common language (1 if 
they have common language, 0 if not). 
Colony ij: a dummy variable indicating if the two partners have a colonial relationship (1 
or 0).  
ε ijt:  Error term of regression. 
βk > 0: In general effective FTA increase bilateral trade between both trading partners. 
α1 and α2 > 0: It is predictable that trade flows increase with the size of economy of 
partners. 
Α3 < 0: serve as proxy for transportation costs; the model presumes that bilateral trade 
flows are negatively to the distance between the partners. 
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α4, α5 and α6: serve respectively as a proxy for transaction costs and cultural ties. Hence 
they influence positively the bilateral trade between partners. 
Empirical results:   Fixed effects estimates for bilateral exports and imports 
Table 7: Fixed Effects Estimates for Bilateral Imports and Exports of Tunisia and 
Morocco 
 IMPORTS  EXPORTS 
Coefficient Morocco  Tunisia  Morocco  Tunisia 
EU-AA 0.378*** 0.279***  -0.387 -0.273 
 
[0.10] [0.09]  [0.10] [0.11] 
AMU 1.292** 0.283  1.714*** 0.459*  
[0.52] [0.34]  [0.48] [0.24] 
Morocco-Tunisia -0.451 -0.227  -1.69 -0.182  
[0.28] [0.19]  [0.34] [0.17] 
GDPi (partner) 0.924*** 1.617***  0.849** 1.017***  
[0.18] [0.24]  [0.13] [0.23] 
GDPj (reporting) 0.91*** -0.642  0.467 0.498  
[0.33] [0.41]  [0.30] [0.44] 
DISTANCE (ij) -0.792 -0.831  -1.484 -1.543 
 [0.04] [0.04] 
 [0.05] [0.05] 
CONTIGUITYij 0.793*** 0.804***  -0.0533 -0.0624  
[0.11] [0.11]  [0.12] [0.12] 
COLONY (ij) 0.304*** 0.261**  0.683*** 0.648***  
[0.11] [0.10]  [0.12] 0.499 
LANGUAGE (ij) 0.855*** 0.683***  0.882*** 0.799***  
[0.06] [0.06]  [0.06] [0.06] 
Constant -38.09 -14.18  -33.00 -32.27  
[7.29] [8.64]  [6.61] [9.24] 
Number of Observations 1432 1176  1358 1051 
R-squared 0.82 0.83  0.84 0.8 
F test for Fixed  Effects: Error 5086 821.7  957.9 7665 
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Notes:                  ***p  < 0.01, ** p  < 0.05, * p  < 0.1 
 
The estimation results show that imports and exports of both countries Tunisia and 
Morocco are deeply influenced by the Euro MED FTA. However, the estimated 
parameters on the indicator variable show positive sign in case of imports 
(Morocco=0.376, Tunisia = 0.279) and negative sign in the case of exports of SMS 
to EU (Morocco=-0.367, Tunisia = -0.263). This indicates that even though the 
EURO MED free trade area with UE enhance the development of trade between 
the EU and SMC, it’s ambiguous since the development is unbalanced in favor of 
EU industrial products exports due to the opening markets and tariff dismantling of 
Tunisia and Morocco. Also this indicate the presence of barriers, on the EU side, 
that restrict agricultural trade, in which both SM countries have comparative 
advantage, and the UE still subsidizing it’s agriculture product.  
As for bilateral trade flows displayed through the Union Arab Maghreb agreement 
parameter show positive sign but still insignificant which indicate that trade among 
SMC still not as developed as predicted. 
Overall, this model show that trade liberalization with EU was effective only in 
leveraging European exports to these two countries and not only does not 
contribute much for increasing the latter’s exports to EU, but also had a negative 
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effect on the development of their industrial activity, things that lead to an 
increasing unemployment. This suggests that the EU is the main beneficiary from 
Euro Med FTA.  
Unlike Tunisia, Morocco’s main exports to the EU are agricultural products and 
textiles (European Commission - DG Trade, 2011). Finding an alternative market 
for these goods may be difficult, thus it is in both North African States economic 
interest to be on good terms with Europe and comply with EU regulations in order 
to further trade relations. 
The main reasons why Tunisia and Morocco has been unable to realize greater 
economic development and higher living standards is the emphasis on trade 
liberalization as a component of the developmental process. It posited that the EU–
SMCs scenario lent credence to the idea that liberalization encouraged 
specialization in agricultural commodities and goods whose production did not 
require a highly skilled labor force or technological sophistication, and hence 
would not reap a substantial economic value added to the MS.  This is in line with 
the assertions of structural change theory, which insists that transforming an 
economy’s productive capacity via industrialization and increased manufacturing is 
a prerequisite to successful development. 
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3.1.2. Impact on trade Balance: 
3.1.2.1. MOROCCO: 
Figure 15: EU share in Morocco's foreign trade 
 
Source: The GlobalEconomy.com, World Bank. 
 
The European Union (EU) is Morocco's main trading partner, accounting for 
59.3% of its foreign trade in 2006, compared to 60.1% in 2005. This group absorbs 
72% of Moroccan exports compared with 74.3% in 2004 and supplied about 52.8% 
of its imports. 
Morocco's trade balance with the European Union, which is structurally deficit, 
reached 27.9 billion dirhams in 2006. With the exception of the surplus with 
respect to Great Britain, at 2.3 billion of dirhams, trade with other members of the 
European Union in 2006 showed high trade deficits, especially vis-à-vis Italy (7.8 














































































Despite the increase in Morocco-EU trade in recent years, Morocco's share of 
overall EU trade has remained relatively stable (0.7% in 2006 against 0.75% in 
2000). 
Morocco is the 31st trading partner of the European Union (36th supplier and 26th 
customer of the EU). Moreover, this share remains below the levels reached by 
other Latin American countries, in this case Brazil (1.7%), or by some Asian 
countries like South Korea (2.4%), India (1.8%) and Hong Kong (1.3%). 
Regarding the geographical structure of Morocco's trade with the EU, France 
remains by far the largest trading partner (accounting for 17.1% of total trade, 
followed by Spain (11.5%) and Italy (6.4%). On the Moroccan exports side to the 
European Union markets, France is ranking as the leading client in Morocco 
exports, absorbing 28% in 2006, second Spain (21%), after comes Great Britain 
(6.9%) and Italy (4.8%)). 
Concerning the product structure, it is worth noting the structural transformations 
of Morocco's exports to the European Union. The share of primary products fell 
sharply from 29.2% in 2001 to 24.2% in 2006, when the share of manufactures 
declined from 69.3% to 63.3% respectively between 2001 and 2006. For its part, 
exports of manufactured products rise to 0.6%. As for the structure of Morocco's 
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imports from the EU, these remain dominated by manufactured products, with 
77.2% of the total in 2006.  
Within this category, the machines and transport equipment are Morocco’s main 
EU imports (26.5% and 9.7% respectively). 
As regards exports, the European Union's share of Morocco's total exports has 
remained relatively stable, while on the import side the weight of the European 
Union has gradually decreased (52.4% in 2006) against 57% in 1996). Among the 
EU countries, France and Spain are Morocco's main partners, holding respectively 
28% and 21% of exports and 17% and 12% of imports. 
This suggests from the outset that the weight of the European Union as a leading 
trading partner has changed only slightly from the years preceding the conclusion 
of the Association Agreement. However, such a simplistic approach does not make 
it possible to effectively measure the real impact of free trade with the European 
Union. To do so, it is necessary to refer to the ratio of exports to GDP, considered 
as an indicator for evaluating the "creation of trade" effect; it rose from 13.9% to 
16% between 1996 and 2017. For its part, the ratio imports / GDP has increased 
between the two periods, from 15% to 21.3%. Such an evolution reflects a relative 
substitution of European products for those from the rest of the world. 
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In view of the available data, it is clear that the potential of the Association 
Agreement between the European Union and Morocco to create additional trade 
flows is far from being achieved. Morocco's share of the Union's markets is still 
below the levels reached by other countries, although they do not benefit from 
geographical and cultural proximity in the same way as Morocco.  
Several factors can be used to explain such a situation, including: 
• The limited nature of trade liberalization which only concerned equipment and 
intermediates, for which Morocco has few competitive advantages to expand its 
market share, in the absence of positive effects of investments in terms of 
technology transfer. 
• Moroccan exports appear to be already evolving to their potential level, thus 
necessitating an acceleration of ongoing reform projects, particularly those aimed 
at improving institutional competitiveness and strengthening the exportable supply. 
• The growing weight of foreign competition opposing any possible expansion of 
exports. This limitation is reinforced by the absence of a dynamic specialization 
model capable of generating a greater adaptation to European import demand. 
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• The integration approach adopted revolves around a sectorial complementarity 
that generates little added value and that does not encourage the spread of technical 
progress and the transfer of know-how. 
3.1.2.2. TUNISIA: 
Figure 16: EU share in Tunisia foreign trade 
 
Source: The GlobalEconomy.com, World Bank. 
 
Tunisia's foreign trade both in terms of exports and imports was already heavily 
concentrated on the EU long before the free trade agreement. In the 1990-1995 
period preceding the agreement, exports to the EU were around 80% of total 
Tunisian exports, while imports were around 73% of the total value of Tunisia's 
imports. Since manufactured exports already enjoyed free access to the European 















































































direct effect on the export side can be expected. The EU's share of Tunisian exports 
has not changed after the free trade agreement, stabilizing at around 80%. 
The EU's share of Tunisia's imports has not increased either, even showing a 
percentage point decrease since 1996. The overall import-to-GDP ratio, which can 
be roughly considered as an indicator of trade creation, has been almost stable 
between the periods preceding and following the Free Trade Agreement from 
41.4% to 41.6% , which represents a minor change. 
The analysis of changes in imports by liberalized list of products also reveals no 
significant effect or creation or diversion of trade., the imports of capital goods 
included in List 1 increased at almost the same rate as the GDP, reaching a stable 
ratio of 9.8 to 9.7%. The EU share remained constant at about 72%, which is more 
or less the same share as for total imports. Imports of raw materials and 
intermediate goods more or less followed growth in GDP and again we found no 
effect of creation or diversion of trade. 
On the other hand, the value of consumer goods in terms of GDP rose faster than 
GDP in the period following the free trade agreement. In 2001 this ratio reached 
even more than 16%. This can be interpreted as a trade creation resulting from the 
reduction of tariffs for goods that have been liberalized since 1996 for list 3 and 
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since 2000 for list. However, these considerations must be qualified by 
distinguishing between on the one hand, consumer goods imported under the "off 
shore" regime which are actually intermediate goods processed on the spot and re-
exported as finished products (textiles, leather products and automotive equipment) 
and, on the other hand, goods intended for the national market . This distinction is 
valid for the years 2000 and 2001. 
The ratio of total imports of consumer goods to GDP rose from 13.8% in 2000 to 
16.1% in 2001. Almost 75% of this increase is due to the offshore sector and the 
remaining 25% relates more specifically to the indoor market. 
It therefore appears at the end of the day that during the most recent period there 
was indeed a trade creation effect for this category of products, but most of this 
creation is in fact due to the rapid expansion of offshore activities rather than 
strong growth in imports for the local market. 
An important conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that there has been 
no noticeable effect of trade creation or diversion in the first six years of the Free 
Trade Agreement (1996-2001). The modest increase in the ratio of imports of 




One of the reasons for the lack of a significant effect of trade creation is probably 
that liberalization has long been limited to capital and intermediate goods that had 
few substitutes for domestic production. 
3.2. Impact on the balance of payment: 
Figure 17: Trend IN Tunisia / Morocco Trade with EU 
 
   Source: The GlobalEconomy.com, World Bank. 
In Tunisia, the trade evolution was marked, over the period between 1999 and 
2017, by a progress in imports (on average +13.3%) which was accompanied by a 
less sustained increase in exports (on average +5.8%). But since 2012, trade 
deficit, was widened by more than 3 billion dinars or 35.2%, coming to 11,635 
MTD compared to   8,604 MTD a year earlier. The rate of coverage dropped 
consequently by 5 percentage points, down to 69.5%. 
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balance of Trade beginning from 2005. Thus the deficit of current account balance 
in % of GDP increased from -0.92 % in 2005 to -8.78 % in 2017. 
The analysis of the evolution of Moroccan and Tunisian balances of payments 
since the entry into force of the association agreements reveals the first three 
following lessons: 
• In Tunisia, export growth was concomitant and of the same magnitude (4 points 
of GDP) as that of imports, allowing the trade deficit to remain around 11 GDP 
points. But beginning from 2015 it start to deepen and aggravate. 
• Deterioration in the country's external position: In Tunisia, the current account 
deficit has been increased which has led to tensions on the foreign exchange 
reserves that materialized starting from 20112. Morocco's position is however more 
comfortable, with foreign exchange reserves exceeding 10 months of imports 
(compared with only 4 months in 2000). In Tunisia, the level remains low (3 
months of imports). 
• Marked currency depreciation: All these developments took place in the presence 
of real depreciation of the currency since the real effective exchange rate of the 
Tunisian dinar has depreciated over the period and also the dirham, which had 
appreciated by 20% between 1991 and 2000 have depreciated by 5%. 
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3.3. Impacts on the state: 
3.3.1. Morocco: 
The tariff dismantling process under the Association Agreement with the European 
Union is resulting in a progressive reduction of customs duties on imports of 
industrial products from the European Union. This process raises implications for 
Moroccan public finances. Thus, when the association agreement with the 
European Union came into force in 2000, Morocco's public finances were still 
dependent on customs revenue, which represented around 3% of GDP, which is 
above average emerging countries. Since then, customs revenue as a percentage of 
GDP has declined steadily to almost 2% in 2006. However, this decline has been 
gradual over the entire period of implementation, unlike the case of Tunisia which 
has exposed to a sharp fall in customs revenue at the beginning of the 
decommissioning period. 
Table 8: Evolution of budget revenues (in% of GDP) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
- Tariffs 2,9 2,9 2,7 2,2 2,3 2,4 2,1 
- Lack of revenue from customs 
duties 
0,2 0,3 0,3 0,5 - 0,8 1,0 






15,5 16,9 17,6 
- Budget deficit -4,7 -2,4 -4,1 -3,1 -3,0 -4,0 -1,7 




As regards the budget deficit, it has remained generally under control in recent 
years, particularly because of the good performance of the customs-free tax 
revenue, in line with the overall favorable trend in national economic activity, 
which largely offset the shortfall in terms of customs revenue. 
Starting from a worrying situation of public finances (budget deficit exceeding 4% 
of GDP in 2000), of which a large part of the revenue consists of customs duties 
and taxes, Morocco has made a great effort to reorient its budgetary resources 
towards the interior activities. To this end, it has embarked on a major tax reform 
aiming, to rationalize and broaden the tax base and strengthen control mechanisms. 
3.3.2. Tunisia: 
In Tunisia, tariff dismantling has resulted in a rapid and sharp reduction in customs 
revenue: equivalent to 4.6 percentage points of GDP in 1995, they represent only 2 
points of GDP in 2002. Over the same period, the apparent taxation of imports 






Figure 18: Revenue and budgetary balances (in % of GDP) in Tunisia and  
Morocco 
 
Source: The GlobalEconomy.com, World Bank DATA. 
 
Trying to estimate how much revenue had Tunisia and Morocco lost when letting 
EU-originating imports enter duty-free, the result is quite significant and explain 
much of the anxiety manifested by these countries during the negotiations period. 
As a percentage of GDP, the revenue lost during the period of 1995 and 2017, is 
equivalent to 6 percent in Tunisia (24.3 percent of total government revenue) and 
less important in Morocco with 1.5 percent of GDP (5.4 percent of total 
government revenue).   













The Moroccan economy presents the structural features of a weakly industrialized 
economy. Representing more than 95% of the Moroccan industrial fabric, SMEs 
(Small and Medium Enterprises) have deficiencies related simultaneously to their 
production capacities, their investments and the jobs they offer, which only 
partially reflect their numerical importance. 
 
Of the 7,737 largest industrial units that make up the country's industrial fabric, in 
2004, 7,214 were small and medium-sized enterprises, which accounts for 93.2% 
of the total number of enterprises. According to the Statistics of the Ministry of 
Employment, this proportion remained broadly stable between 1992 and 2004 and 
this stability is also true in most industrial branches. 
 
However, while the pace of SME creation has been slow during the 1990s, the 
latter has become more pronounced since the beginning of the year 2000s. This 
break can be explained by the acceleration of the liberalization reforms of the 
economy which have made access to markets and funding more easily for domestic 
firms. The considerable growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) has also played 
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an important role. Indeed, it has favored the development of many local industrial 
enterprises, mainly in the framework of subcontracting activities. 
In fact, FDI and liberalization reforms have not produced the same impact in the 
different branches of the economy. They accentuate the heterogeneity of the fabric 
of SMEs. The table below indicates in particular that these companies are divided 
into several large strata that contribute to the formation of the industrial fabric. The 
number of industrial units with fewer than 50 employees is by far very large 
(79.9%) relative to those employing 50 to 99 employees and to SMEs with 100 to 
199 employees. SMEs employing less than 50 people represent more than 3/4 of 
Moroccan industrial units. This proportion remained almost stable during the 
period 1992-2004. In second place are SMEs with 50 to 99 employees (12.3%), 
while SMEs with 100 to 199 employees represent 7.8%. 
Table 9: Number and share of Moroccan SMEs by workforce 
Years 
SME < 50 SME from 50 
to 99 
SME from 100 to 
199 
SME < 200 
Number In % Number In % Number In % Number In % 
1992 4374 73,1 698 18,4 482 7,7 5554 91,5 
1995 4434 73,4 1190 18,7 491 8,1 5624 93,2 
2000 4365 76,8 290 18,2 346 5,7 5795 96,0 
2005 4819 74,0 717 10,9 492 7,6 6021 92,5 
2010 4906 74,9 698 10,6 469 7,1 6073 92,5 
2015 5765 79,9 884 12,3 565 7,8 7214 93,2 




The remarkable preponderance of SMEs in terms of numbers is far from reflecting 
their productive capacities. Indeed, the added value created by these units has 
never been able to reach half of the total industrial production of the country. 
Figure 19: Evolution of the production of the SMEs between 1992 and 2015(In 
MDH) 
 
Source: According to figures from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Kingdom of 
Morocco, 2004. 
 
SME production has grown at an insignificant pace. This is due in particular to the 
weakness of the financial structures of these units which only marginally allow 
them to make the necessary efforts to modernize them. Investment in capital goods, 
which is the condition for higher productivity, represents a small fraction of the 
self-financing capacity of these companies, which are often destined to deal with 











strong relationship among small firms, more than anywhere else, between the 
volumes of value added the level of the profit margin, the investment effort and the 
successful industrial companies. 
Regarding the contribution to employment, Moroccan SMEs offer less than 43% of 
the jobs created in 2004, a percentage much lower than the share of these 
companies in the industrial fabric. The category of stable jobs created in SMEs fell 
between 1997 and 2017, from 51% to less than 43%. This decline is mainly due to 
lower investment in these firms. 
3.4.2. Tunisia: 
Investment has increased in Tunisia countries to reach a level of 26% of GDP 
between 2000 and 2015, a significant improvement of the situation in 1995-1999: + 
2 points of GDP.  
This overall increase in the level of investment since the implementation of the 
Barcelona Process between the period 1995-1999 and the period 2000-2015 mask 
two opposite developments: 
• Non-government investment has grown significantly: an increase of GDP in both 
countries between the two periods. 
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• The growth of private investment materializes both the improvement of the 
business environment and the financing conditions. 
 
Table 10: Investment rate in Tunisia (in% of GDP) 
 1995-1996 1997-1999 2000-2015 
Local 
Investment 
23,7 25,0 25,8 
Public 
Investment 
5,9 5,4 4,6 
Private 
Investment 
17,8 19,6 21,2 
Source: Statistics of the Ministry of Finance, Tunisia, 2017. 
 
In contrast, government investment contracted by 1.3 percentage points of GDP 
between the two periods. The drop in public investment reflects the fiscal 
rationalization efforts undertaken by the two states, which have notably reduced 
their investments in the transport sector, a sector that is essential for improving the 
business environment. 
 
• A progressive reallocation of the factors of production: the information 
provided by the National Institute of Statistics of Tunisia shows that a 
process of reallocation of factors of production is underway in the Tunisian 
industrial sector, they indicate the following tendencies: 
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➢ Capital growth appears to be much higher (61%) than that of jobs (2%), ind
icating an increase in the capital intensity of production in the Tunisian indu
strial sector. This development is in line with the objective of increasing the
 productivity of industrial production; 
➢ Companies with more than 100 employees concentrate a growing share of t
he factors of production: they created jobs over the period unlike smaller co
mpanies and the growth of their investments was much more sustained; 
➢ Some reallocations of the factors of production take place between the indu
strial branches. The chemical industries, for example, are cutting jobs and c
utting investment, while the electricity industries are creating jobs and inves
ting. If these analyzes deserve to be refined, they leave in any case appear t










4. CHAPTER 4: INTRA REGIONAL IMPACT OF EMFTAs:  
In this chapter we will focus on the inter-industry trade index of the Maghreb 
countries (Tunisia and Morocco). By applying The Grubel and Lloyd index, we try 
to investigate the degree of inter-industry trade between countries; will be 
calculated from the tables for exports and imports of industrialized products from 
1997 to 2017. First, we will analyze the nature of trade between the two Maghreb 
countries on the one hand and the European Union on the other. 
4.1. Creation of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU): 
 
The declaration establishing the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was signed in 
Marrakech on 17 February 1989. Initialed by Mauritania, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria 
and Morocco, the UMA aims to: 
➢ Strengthen the bonds of fraternity that unite Member States and their people 
➢ Achieve the progress and prosperity of the societies that compose them and 
defend their rights. 
➢ Contribute to the preservation of peace based on justice and equity. 
➢ To work progressively towards the free movement of persons, services,      
goods and capital. 
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The proclamation of the UMA, which had already been envisaged in a premonitory 
speech made in 1958 in Tangiers by King Mohammed V, responds to the concern 
to strengthen the links of economic complementarity in the Maghreb and reduce 
the isolation of these countries members. In parallel, two conventions have been 
concluded by the Maghreb countries. 
 The first, on the exchange of agricultural products, was signed on 23 July 1990 
and provides: 
• Progressive building between the contracting parties of a customs union wit
h a view to realize a common North African agricultural market. 
• The exemption of agricultural products traded, of local origin and               
provenance, customs duties and taxes having equivalent effect imposed       
on   imports, with the exception of taxes on local production in each             
 country of the union 
• Establishment of a Food Safety Commission to draw up lists agricultural     
 products exempt from any tariff measure. 
The second convention concerns commercial and tariff aspects, concluded on 
March 10, 1991 between the UMA countries, and deals with: 
• The exemption from customs duties, taxes and charges having equivalent    
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   effect imposed on the importation of traded products, of origin and of       
  local origin. 
• The exemption of traded products, of origin and local origin, and defined in
 lists, of all non-tariff measures. 
As an extension of the Marrakech declaration, several bilateral free trade 
agreements have been concluded between Tunisia and Morocco. 
The agreement signed between Morocco and Tunisia, which entered into force on 
March 16, 1999, provides for the creation of a free trade area between the two 
parties during a transitional period that ended on December 31, 2007. The tariff 
dismantling scheme is designed according to the sensitivity and the nature of the 
products appearing in the lists annexed to the agreement. 
 
The benefit of preferential tariff treatment is reserved for products which satisfy the 
rules of origin and the rule of “direct transport" rule, which refer to the convey 
products directly from the exporting country to the importing country, without 
passing through a third country.  
4.2. Calculation of the GRUBEL and LLOYD index: 
The Grubel & Lloyd index shows the degree of inter-industry trade between 
countries.  In this section I will Apply this indicator to exports and imports of 
industrial products (1997 to 2017) of both Tunisia and Morocco. 
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Equation 2: Grubel and Lloyd index 
GLt = [(Xi + Mi) - │X i-Mi│ / (Xi + Mi)]      
 where 
                            Xi: exports of product i;  
                            Mi: imports of the product i 
                             t: the year considered 
GL t is such that its results are between [0 and 1]. When it reaches 0, the 
specialization is Inter-branch. When it tends to 1, it is intra-branch. 
For example for the year 2004, in Morocco the index will be calculated as follows: 
GL = [(6 384, 73 + 6 477, 31) - │6 384, 73 - 6 477, 31│/ ([(6 384, 73 + 6 477, 31)] 
GL = [(12 862.04) - │-92.58│/ (12 862.04)] 
GL = [12 769.46 / (12 862.04)] 
GL = 0.99 
In this case the index is approximately 1; we can conclude the existence of intra-
industry trade in Morocco. The indicator thus gives the share of intra-industry trade 








1997 0.94 0.96 
1998 0.98 0.92 
1999 0.97 1.00 
2000 0.99 0.88 
2001 0.97 0.95 
2002 0.96 0.92 
2003 0.92 0.96 
2004 0.87 0.98 
2005 0.83 0.96 
2006 0.83 0.98 
2007 0.78 0.99 
2008 0.74 0.99 
2009 0.73 0.98 
2010 0.76 0.97 
2011 0.74 0.94 
2012 0.73 0.93 
2013 0.73 0.92 
2014 0.76 0.90 
2015 0.81 0.89 
2016 0.78 0.89 
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Figure 20: Evolution of the Grubel and Lloyd index for industrial products 
 
Source: World Bank data. 
The situation for Morocco and Tunisia is almost identical; since the value of the 
Grubel and Lloyd index is almost the same for both countries and tends to 1. This 
similarity is the result of the development of an efficient manufacturing base in 
Morocco and Tunisia (textile in particular), countries that have been able to take 
advantage of customs preferences granted by the European Union in the context of 
outward processing trade. That is to say the privileged orientation of trade between 
Morocco and Tunisia with the European Union has developed a similarity of 
productive structures in these two countries. 
This situation has even generated fierce competition between Morocco and Tunisia 
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industries where Morocco also has a comparative advantage in the European 
market.  
While multiple shortcomings seem to constrain the potential for regional 
integration, their elimination would require a strong political will for cooperation, 
in a context where characterized by regionalism and globalization as well. 
 Table 12: Evolution of the Global Grubel and Lloyd index 
GL Global  index 
 
Tunisia/Morocco Tunisia/EU Morocco/EU 
Years    
1997 0.81 - - 
1998 0.88 - - 
1999 0.92 - - 
2000 0.57 0.86 0.88 
2001 0.77 0.88 0.91 
2002 0.94 0.89 0.90 
2003 0.93 0.93 0.88 
2004 0.92 0.94 0.85 
2005 0.71 0.92 0.87 
2006 0.79 0.93 0.82 
2007 0.61 0.97 0.79 
2008 0.55 0.98 0.74 
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2009 0.48 0.94 0.71 
2010 0.60 0.92 0.72 
2011 0.56 0.95 0.73 
2012 0.76 0.92 0.71 
2013 0.67 0.91 0.73 
2014 0.79 0.92 0.77 
2015 0.83 0.94 0.81 
2016 0.81 0.94 0.79 
 

















Table 13: Intra-industry trade indicators 
 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 
Morocco/EU 10,52 18,76 21,69 22,10 20,56 
Tunisia /EU 22,58 22,30 22,66 28,19 27,47 
Source: FEMISE Report 2010. 
 
Overall, there is a significant improvement in intra-industry trade shares between 
the two periods 1995-2000 and 2000-2009, with a greater increase in this type of 
trade with the rest of the world.  
While the general trend is to improve intra-industry trade shares, it is mainly with 
partners in the rest of the world that intra-trade levels branches are the most 
significant. However, we note that the two countries closest to the EU, Tunisia and 
Morocco, develop this type of trade more strongly with their European partners. 
Finally, over the past 15 years, MPs have slightly improved their performance in 
terms of expanding the range of products exported and bringing export structures 
closer to the global average. However, taking PM individually does not show the 
same results. Tunisia diversifies its export basket. Similarly, during the same 
period, Morocco's export structures are moving closer to global average structures. 
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5. CHAPTER 5: OUTCOMES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION: 
 
In this chapter, we will present the preliminary findings of the study with 
interpretation by using some review of Literature and researches and answer the 
research questions, approve or reject the research hypothesis and provide some 
recommendations for future studies and policies. 
5.1. Preliminary Findings: 
1. Current Account deficit and unbalanced impact on trade: the chronic trade 
deficit engendered by the trade liberalization has induced a permanent deficit in the 
balance of payment in MPCs. That suggests that EMFTA serves only the interests 
of the EU. 
2. Public expenditure and budgetary vulnerability: The Euro Med Free trade area 
decreased   the state revenues through loss in tariffs receipts and increase public 
expenditure. To run the increased public deficits, government  trying to fill the 
gap they borrowed money from international markets and organizations (IMF 
or world bank) which explain the rise of debt rate during the last decade and 
also by rising the indirect taxes on consumption, things that reduced the real 
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disposable income of the population and effected negatively the income 
distribution. 
3.Asymmetrical interdependence: Trade liberalization has encouraged both 
countries to specialize in producing agriculture products, primary commodities 
and elementary labor-intensive and resource-based manufactures that requires 
low technology intensity such as textile; things in which the two economies 
already enjoys a comparative advantage. Hence the two countries did not 
succeed to achieve specialization transition towards producing more 
sophisticated manufactures with higher economic value-added. 
4. Depreciating currency: The deterioration of the current account balance has 
decreased terms of trade in MP and as a mean to counterbalance the loss 
competitiveness in the local markets they devaluate their currency against Euro. 
This has generate inflation and let to a restrictive monetary policy. 
5 Increasing unemployment rate: job destruction due to a continuing rise in 
imported industrial products that substitute goods previously produced locally. 
Also experiencing permanent competitive pressures by foreign firms, they tend 




6. Many small and medium enterprises have been forced to quit the market by the 
flow of cheaper imports and also by lack of competitiveness. 
7. Aggravation of the economic gap between SMPs and European Union and the 
gap of income levels among the two countries income class. 
8. No effect on foreign direct investments (FDI), one of the main goals expected 
and sought by south Mediterranean countries. 
9. Rapid rise in external indebtedness and the existence of financial and trade 
imbalances. 
5.2. Shortcomings of EURO-MED FTA: 
 
Despite trade liberalization, the integration between EU and SMCs, remains 
incomplete and superficial because of not only the level of tariffs applied by MPs 
to EU imports that still significant but also because of , persistent protection of 
agriculture, presence of significant NTBs, restrictive rules of origin and lack of 
liberalization of services. 





Table 14: Average rates applied by the Maghreb countries in 2009 
 Tariffs with the 
rest of the world 
Tariffs with the EU Quote part of duty 
free line 
Tunisia 22.2 18 39.2 
Morocco 8.2 3.6 51 
Source: FEMISE Report. 
 
This table provides some insight into the progress made by the Maghreb countries 
in terms of tariff liberalization. The first column is a perspective on the average 
tariffs charged by MPs to all countries. Morocco has also made progress, while 
Tunisia is moving more slowly. 
To some extent these results explain the limited effects of the Barcelona 
Agreement. In other words, the slow rate of tariff elimination in the MP leads to a 
limited margin of preference for EU imports into the MP markets. As a result, the 
observed effects of the Euro Med FTA are much smaller than the potential effects 
identified by many scholars. 
S.2.The protection of agriculture leads to losses of efficiency: 
As liberalization of agriculture is excluded from the Euro Med FTA, protection 
remains strong in the MPs and in the EU countries. In fact, Table 15 shows 
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significant average tariffs, particularly in Tunisia but also Morocco. More 
important than tariffs, NTBs in agriculture remain at particularly high levels. 
Indeed, the calculation of "Trade Restrictiveness Indexes" by Kee et al. (2009)16 
suggests that: 
(i) NTBs protection is far superior to tariff protection;  
(ii) ii) in agriculture, TRIs are generally higher than those of manufactured 
products;  
(iii) iii) In the MPs the NTBs are particularly high compared to the tariff pr
otection, especially for Morocco and Tunisia (following table). 
Table 15: Trade Restriction Indexes (TRIs) for Tariffs and NTBs 
 Tariffs and NTBs Tariffs only 
EU 0.45 0.08 
Tunisia 0.94 0.1 
Morocco 0.71 0.09 
Source: FEMISE Report. 
 
S.3. Non-tariff barriers remain high in MPs 
                                                          
16 Hiau Looi Kee,  2009,  ESTIMATING TRADE RESTRICTIVENESS INDICES 
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As shown above, the elimination of tariffs does not mean the elimination of 
commercial protections. Indeed, the Barcelona Agreement does not take into 
account the elimination of NTBs, as MPs still apply strong global protection. 
To illustrate this statement, Kee et al. (2009)17 recently calculated the ad-valorem 
equivalent (AVEs) of NTBs in 91 countries worldwide. The main results are 
presented in table no. It is striking that PM has significant AVEs for NTBs. For 
example, in Tunisia and Morocco, NTBs have an average of around 40% in tariff 
equivalent. If we add these AVEs to persistent tariff protection vis-à-vis the EU, the 
overall protection is 60%. 
Table 16: Tariff protection in agriculture (%) 
 Tariff  Average Rate Tariff maximum Rate 
EU n.a n.a 
Tunisia 49 889 
Morocco 23.1 227 
Source: FEMISE Report. 
 
S.4.The specific impact of Technical Trade Barriers: 




Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) seem to be a major obstacle to trade, as 
Michalek (2005)18 demonstrates. According to this author, unlike CEECs, only a 
small portion of MP exports are subject to regulation. This partly reflects the 
inability of MPs to comply with technical regulations or standards applied in the 
EU. In any case, the existence of substantial TBTs leads to trade distortion in PM-
EU trade, the result being that potential gains from economic integration cannot be 
exploited.  
S.5. the rules of origin are often restrictive: 
Rules of origin (RoOs) define the conditions that a product must meet to be 
considered as coming from the country for which preferential access is established. 
The main justification for RoOs lies in the prevention of commercial deflection, a 
process allowing a product from a non-participating country to enter the EU 
through free trade partners with the EU in the purpose of avoiding paying customs 
duties. However, according to several authors, the ROOs are sometimes restrictive 
and lead to significant costs and a commercial reduction within a Preferential 
Commercial Zone (Breton and Manchin, 2003 19 ). However, the restrictions 
                                                          
18Jan Michalek, 2007  Comparative analysis of importance of technical barriers to trade (TBT) for 
Central and Eastern European Countries’ and Mediterranean Partner Countries’ exports to the EU 
19 Breton and Manchin, 2003, Preferential Rules of Origin 
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associated with ROOs also depend on the specification on accumulation, which can 
be bilateral, diagonal or complete. 
S.6. the services were excluded from the Barcelona Agreement: 
Services initially excluded from the Barcelona Agreement are another aspect of the 
failure of integration between the EU and the MPs. The lack of liberalization of 
services is also a major obstacle to commercial gains. In fact, Togan and Michalek 
(2007)20 show   a significant effect on GDP, especially for Tunisia. However, since 
the early 2000s, some progress has been made by MPs in two areas. First, they 
initiated an improvement in liberalization through engagement with GATS. Then, 
the initiation of regional negotiations in 2006 for the liberalization of services with 
the EU should progressively improve the situation on condition that an agreement 
is concluded and implemented. 
S.7. the lack of true horizontal integration (GAFTA): 
As suggested by several authors, MPs may be in a position to benefit from more 
vertical integration (with the EU) provided that horizontal integration (with other 
MPs) is also achieved (Puga and Venables, 1997, Péridy and Bagoulla, 2010b). 
This can be explained by the fact that integration between MPs should improve the 
                                                          




efficiency of production processes in this area (through segmentation of markets, 
economies of scale, appropriate industrial location and other efficiencies). This 
should then increase gains throughout the Euro med area, through upstream / 
downstream spillover effects. However, despite real efforts by MPs to reduce tariffs 
in the GAFTA zone, it is clear that south-south regional integration is far from 
being achieved. There are still many obstacles. 
S.8. Specialization in MP is constantly based on low added value products: 
The MP exports still focus on low value added products. Despite a recent 
improvement by increasing the technical content of products, progress towards 
level improvement is too slow. Many researches highlight the role of education and 
research in explaining the economic success of some countries in terms of growth 
and convergence. For PM, although their average growth performance over the last 
decade is slightly higher than that of the EU15 (around 3%), several authors argue 
that some MPs have not clearly engaged their convergence towards EU per capita 
levels (Guétat and Serranito, 201021), except Tunisia. This raises the question about 
the causes of this phenomenon. Though, the innovation gap between EU countries 
                                                          
21 Guétat and Serranito, 2010, Rattrapage technologique et convergence : un test par les séries 
temporelles dans le cas des pays de la région MENA 
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and MPs is a major factor explaining the process of convergence between these 
two zones22. 
5.3. Policy Recommendation: 
The investigation of the effects of EURO MED Free Trade Agreement and the 
identification of the main obstacles to these effects being limited, lead to the 
following recommendations: 
1. MPs must complete their tariff elimination vis-à-vis EU products. Be that as 
it may, the completion of tariff elimination in the coming years is expected 
to generate additional gains in trade and social assistance, gains that are 
lacking today. 
2. Priority must also be given to the removal of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). 
Indeed, the MPs are posting significant NTBs; especially Morocco NTBs 
represent around 40% of tariff equivalent. Tunisia occupies an intermediate 
position, that is to say close to the world average (13%). In addition, the EU 
must also reduce its NTBs to MPs since the EU's tariff equivalent is also 
important (13%). 
3. Among the different kind of NTBs that can be reduced, technical barriers to 
                                                          
22 Nicolas Péridy, 2010,  Un modèle généralisé des déterminants des migrations internationals. 
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trade can be eliminated by moving towards mutual recognition or adoption 
of EU technical regulation. 
4. The issue of liberalization of agriculture has long been debated. It has 
become a political problem. The level of protection (including NTBs) is 
currently very high, not only in MPs (where trade restriction indices are 
0.94 in Tunisia) but also in the EU (0.45). Greater liberalization in 
agriculture would: 
a) Produces more profitability and gains in terms of social assistance; 
b) Stimulate comparative advantages and therefore exports, particularly in 
Morocco, which enjoys a significant comparative advantage for these 
products; 
c) Reduce the migratory pressure of seasonal workers (insofar as domestic 
production would be possible on a larger scale in MPs before export to the 
EU). 
5. Liberalization of services is needed to increase profitability and welfare 
gains from the Barcelona Agreement. Despite significant progress in the 
last decade in terms of liberalization, significant progress remains to be 
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made. Morocco can make greater efforts in liberalizing strategic service 
companies that the government still controls. In addition, the issue of 
currency control, which acts as a cross-cutting barrier, should be 
investigated. Finally, a specific agreement with the EU seems necessary to 
create a real FTA including services.  
6. The gap in innovation between the EU and the SMC countries prevents 
them from converging on EU GDP standards. As a result, Regional 
integration and trade liberalization are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions to stimulate growth in MPs and facilitate the process of 
convergence. Therefore, Mediterranean governments should prioritize 
education, innovation and, human capital. 
7. SMCs euro centric trade policy approach makes them very dependent to the 
European context and extremely influenced by its crisis and shocks. 
Therefore MS should  diversify their cooperation trying to shape new 
horizons of effective cooperation, where they can implement effective trade 
agreements, benefit more and achieve their industrialization process, for 






Having studied the impact of trade liberalization in the two SMC Tunisia and 
Morocco, shortcomings of the Euro MED Free trade area have become clearer.   
We have found that while trade liberalization with the EU in the form of new 
Association Agreements was on average effective in raising their bilateral imports 
from the EU at the same time it did not contribute positively to the expansion of 
their exports to the EU as well. This has led to chronic current account deficit. 
 
 The negative and statistically significant coefficients on the two countries 
indicators evidence the presence of trade restrictions on exports to the EU. This 
suggests that the EU member states are the main beneficiaries of the FTA, due to 
the opening of the MS markets only to industrial products while keeping the EU 
markets closed to imports of agricultural goods from MPS. And as we have seen 
through the analysis of the evolution of the Grubel and Lloyd index, bilateral trade 
between these countries remains at a very low level. This suggest that Free trade 
agreements with the Maghreb countries thus have costs related to the fall in 
revenue based on customs duties, to competition from European products; they 
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generate transitional costs in the short term. The trade balance of the Maghreb 
countries have deteriorated during the last five years and it required an influx of 
capital to offset the current account deficit. 
 
Under these conditions, the Euro-Maghreb partnership is largely dependent on 
Europe's ability to open its markets, including the agricultural market, since the 
creation of the FTA is not only intended to intensify trade but also to develop a 
production area through enhancing offshoring of economic activities and a 
sustaining the movement of capital flows towards private companies. 
 
Despite extensive trade liberalization, the economies of Tunisia and Morocco have 
performed very poorly in the last 10 years and income inequality has worsened. 
In general we can argue that EMFTA, with the only objective of free movement of 
industrial goods, is not in the interest of SMS at their actual state of economic and 
social development unless it’s accompanied by an implementation of 
complementary measures such as export promotion policies, strategic investment 
in structural change, protection of infant industry and supportive exchange rate 
policies. In other worlds, sensible management of trade, to achieve a balance 
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between the growth of exports and imports so as to avoid balance of payments 
deficits, to identify and encourage new areas of comparative advantage, and to 
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1995 년 11 월, 유럽연합은 남부 지중해와의 정치, 경제, 사회적 관계를 강화하기 
위하여 포괄적이고 다차원적인 발의안으로서 바르셀로나 프로세스를 의결하였다. 
본 연구는 바르셀로나 프로세스의 산하 안건들 중 하나인 지중해 파트너십, (유럽 - 
지중해 파트너쉽) 에 관한 것이다. 지중해 파트너십 (EMP) 의 핵심은 해당 지역의 
번영을 촉진하고 사회경제적 발전을 이룩하기 위하여 유럽공동체(유럽 연합)와 
(각지중해 국가) 간 자유무역 협정을 체결하는 것과 장기적으로 MS 간에 이와 
유사한 협정을 체결하는 것에 있다. 
 
본 연구에서는, 자유무역협정이 1994 년부터 2017 년에 튀니지와 모로코에 미친 
경제적 효과를 Pan-Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA), 아가디르 협정 (the Agadir 
Agreement)에 의한 효과와 대조하여 평가하고자 한다. 
 
본 논문은 튀니지와 모로코 간 비교 사례연구의 모형을 사용한다. 각국의 발전 
상황을 추적하고, 무역 자유화 및 관세 철폐를 통한 자유 무역 지대로의 이행이 각국 
경제 변수에 끼치는 영향을 분석하는 것이 이 연구의 목표이다. 
  
이 연구가 Euro-Med 경제 통합 과정에 관한 기존 연구에 기여한 내용은 다음과 같다. 
i) 2017 년까지 평가 (비판적 분석) 를 확장한다(1995 년에서 2017 년 사이). 
ii) 업데이트된 데이터를 통해 남지중해 국가(SMCs)의 관점에서 유로 MED 무역 
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